Foundation Blocks

A Complete Guide to Drafting a Company Memorandum of Incorporation (MoI)

A detailed guide on drafting Company Memorandums of Incorporation (MoIs).
This guide contains a comprehensive analysis of the different building blocks of Company Memorandums of Incorporation (MoIs)


What is a Memorandum of Incorporation?

The Memorandum of Incorporation (MoI) effectively serves as the charter for a company, outlining key aspects of its governance and operations. Here are the main points covered in an MoI:

  • Company type and purpose: The MoI specifies the type of company (e.g., private, public, non-profit).

  • Capital structure: It details the company’s capital structure, including the types of shares and the number of shares that can be issued.

  • Shareholder rights: The document outlines the rights, duties, and responsibilities of shareholders.

  • Directors: It specifies the composition, powers, and functioning of the board of directors.

  • Meetings: The MoI includes rules and procedures for shareholder and director meetings.

The MoI is filed with the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission (CIPC) in South Africa and is a public document.

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The Company

Powers and capacity

Section 19 (1) (b) (i) of the Companies Act, 2008, stipulates that a Company has all the legal powers and capacity of an individual, but with the caveat that these powers can be limited or constrained by the provisions laid out in the company’s Memorandum of Incorporation (MoI). 

Here’s a practical example where the MoI needs to include provisions limiting the powers and capacity of the Company:

Imagine a company, EcoTech Innovations (Pty) Ltd, that specializes in developing eco-friendly technologies. Its primary business involves researching and creating sustainable energy solutions. The investors looking to invest in EcoTech Innovations (Pty) Ltd require that the MoI includes a clause that limits the company’s ability to invest in or start projects related to fossil fuel extraction and processing.

Alterations and amendments to the MoI

The default position under the Companies Act, 2008, determines that an amendment to the MoI can be proposed either by the company’s board or by shareholders who hold at least 10% of the voting rights. Section 16. (2) provides that the MoI may provide different requirements with respect to proposals for amendments. 

If a company wants to make it easier for shareholders to propose amendments (e.g., by lowering the threshold from 10% of voting rights to 5%), this can promote greater shareholder involvement and ensure that minority voices are heard.

On the other hand, a company might increase the threshold for proposing amendments to ensure that only significant and well-considered changes are brought forward.


Among its many functions, the MoI specifies the company’s approach to financial management and accountability, particularly in terms of auditing requirements and compliance with the Companies Act, 2008. These provisions in the MoI must be tailored to each company’s specific needs and circumstances, considering factors such as the size of the company, the nature of its business, and its ownership structure.


  • Auditing Requirements:

    The MoI must specify whether the company’s financial statements need to be audited.


  • Compliance with enhanced accountability requirements:

    The MoI must provide if the Company elects to comply with the enhanced accountability requirements as set out in Chapter 3 of the Companies Act, 2008. These requirements relate to the appointment of a Company secretary, appointment of an auditor and the establishment of an audit committee.


  • Chapter 5, Parts B and C

    The MoI also needs to stipulated if Chapter 5, parts B and C are applicable or not. These chapters relate to the Takeover Regulation Panel as well as regulated transactions and offers.


The decision on these matters should be based on the company’s individual characteristics:

  • For a small, owner-managed company, the need for an audit might not be as stringent, considering the lower risk of financial mismanagement due to the close involvement of the owner. Similarly, such a company might not require strict adherence to the enhanced accountability requirements of Chapter 3 or Parts B and C of Chapter 5, as these can be overly burdensome for small enterprises.

  • In contrast, a larger company with numerous shareholders, significant turnover, and a complex operational structure would likely require a mandatory audit to ensure financial transparency and accuracy. Compliance with the enhanced accountability requirements becomes more critical to safeguard the interests of various stakeholders and ensure regulatory compliance.


Section 15(3) of the Companies Act, 2008, in South Africa, empowers the board of directors of a company to make, amend, or repeal rules relating to the company’s governance on matters not specifically addressed by the Act or the company’s Memorandum of Incorporation (MoI).

This provision grants the board considerable flexibility in managing and governing the company. However, the MoI can modify this default position, either expanding, restricting, or specifying the board’s rule-making powers. Amending the default position might be necessary or advantageous in situations where the Company is a large or complex company with many shareholders or diverse business operations. In the aforementioned situation, shareholders might prefer to have more direct oversight or input into the rule-making process. The MoI could be amended to require shareholder approval for certain types of rules or to limit the scope of the board’s rule-making authority, ensuring that major governance decisions reflect the wider interests of the shareholders.

Company Securities


The Memorandum of Incorporation (MoI) of a company plays a critical role in defining its capital structure, particularly regarding its shares. According to Section 36 of  the Companies Act, 2008, the MoI must specify the classes of shares and the number of shares of each class that the company is authorised to issue. Understanding the difference between authorised and issued shares and the specific rights and limitations attached to each class of shares is is important.


Authorised vs. Issued Shares

  • Authorised shares: These are the maximum number of shares that a company is allowed to issue, as stipulated in its MoI. It represents the total share capital that the company can potentially issue to shareholders.

  • Issued shares: These are the shares that have actually been issued to shareholders. The number of issued shares can be less than or equal to the number of authorised shares but cannot exceed it.


Important aspects of each class of shares

When defining classes of shares, the MoI must address the following key aspects:

  • Voting rights: The MoI should specify the voting rights attached to each class of shares. Some shares might have full voting rights, while others could have limited or no voting rights. For example, ordinary shares typically carry one vote per share, whereas preference shares might have no voting rights.

  • Dividend rights: The MoI should detail the rights of shareholders to receive dividends. This includes the right to receive preference dividends, where applicable. Preference shares often have a fixed dividend rate and are typically paid dividends before ordinary shareholders.

  • Liquidation rights: The MoI should state the rights of shareholders to receive a proportion of the company’s residual value upon liquidation. Preference shares might have priority over ordinary shares in the distribution of residual assets.


Additional preferences, rights, limitations, or terms

Additional provisions can be tailored to each class of shares to meet specific company needs or investment strategies:

  1. Redemption rights: Some shares might be redeemable at the option of either the company or the shareholder, often at a predetermined price.

  2. Conversion rights: Shares might have the option to be converted into another class of shares under certain conditions.

  3. Anti-dilution provisions: These provisions protect shareholders from dilution in case the company issues more shares in the future.


Practical Scenarios

  • Technology startup: A tech startup might issue two classes of shares: class a ordinary shares with full voting rights for the founders and venture capitalists, and class b preference shares with a fixed dividend rate but no voting rights for angel investors. This structure allows founders and major investors to retain control over company decisions while providing angel investors with priority in dividends.

  • Family-owned business: In a family-owned business, the family members might hold class a ordinary shares with voting rights, while external investors are issued preference shares with no voting rights but with a fixed dividend rate. This setup enables the family to maintain control over the business while offering attractive returns to external investors.

In conclusion, the provisions in the MoI regarding shares must be carefully structured to balance the control, income, and liquidation preferences of different shareholders, aligning with the company’s strategic objectives and investor expectations.


Unclassified Shares

Section 36(1)(c) of the Companies Act, 2008, introduces a provision for “unclassified shares” in a company’s Memorandum of Incorporation (MoI). This provision allows for a degree of flexibility. Here’s an explanation of how this works and its implications:

The MoI may authorize a certain number of shares without classifying them into specific a specific class. These unclassified shares can later be classified into different classes (e.g., Class F, Class G, etc.) by the board of directors as and when the need arises. This allows the company to respond to changing financial needs, investment opportunities, or strategic directions without having to amend the MoI each time.

While these shares are initially unclassified, the MoI must already outline the preferences, rights, limitations, and other terms associated with these shares. This pre-determination is crucial for legal and operational clarity and ensures that the board’s classification of these shares at a later stage is not arbitrary but follows the MoI.



Class X Shares

Section 36(1)(d) of the Companies Act, 2008, introduces an interesting aspect of share classification in a company’s Memorandum of Incorporation (MoI). This provision allows a company to define a class of shares without specifying the associated preferences, rights, limitations, or other terms. Instead, it empowers the board of directors to determine these aspects at a later stage. This approach offers significant flexibility for the company’s capital management and strategic planning.

The MoI can establish a class of shares (like Class C) but leave the specifics of these shares (such as voting rights, dividend preferences, etc.) to be determined by the board at a future date.

This flexibility is particularly valuable in allowing a company to respond rapidly to changing market conditions, investment opportunities, or strategic needs. For example, if the company needs to raise capital quickly or wants to attract a specific type of investor, the board can tailor the rights and preferences of these shares to suit the situation.


Debt instruments

The provisions in Section 43 of the Companies Act, 2008, outlines the framework for the issuance and management of debt instruments by companies. These provisions, in conjunction with the company’s Memorandum of Incorporation (MoI), govern how a company can issue debt instruments, the nature of these instruments, and any special privileges they may confer.

As per Section 43(1)(a), a debt instrument includes any security other than shares of a company. This can include bonds, debentures, or other forms of debt securities. However, it does not include simple promissory notes or loans.

Section 43(1)(b) defines a “security document” as any document that embodies the terms and conditions of a debt instrument, such as a trust deed or certificate.

Section 43(2)(a) states that the company’s board may authorize the issuance of secured or unsecured debt instruments, unless restricted by the company’s MoI. This gives the board considerable flexibility in deciding how and when to raise debt.

The board must determine whether each debt instrument issued is secured (backed by the company’s assets) or unsecured.

 Under Section 43(3), except as limited by the MoI, a debt instrument may grant its holders special privileges. These can include rights to attend and vote at general meetings, influence the appointment of directors, or involve the allotment or substitution of securities.


Provisions relating to debt instruments in the MoI

The MoI can play a significant role in shaping a company’s approach to debt instruments and can:

  • restrict or expand the board’s authority to issue debt instruments. For instance, it might require shareholder approval for the issuance of certain types of debt or for debt over a certain amount;
  • outline specific terms and conditions for debt instruments, including interest rates, maturity periods, and redemption rights;
  • limit or specify the types of special privileges that debt instruments can confer, ensuring they align with the company’s strategic objectives and governance structure; and
  • help ensure that the issuance of debt instruments aligns with the company’s overall financial strategy and risk management policies.

Changes to capital structure

Section 36(3) of the Companies Act, 2008, grants the board of a company significant flexibility in managing the company’s share capital. It allows the board to increase or decrease the number of authorized shares, reclassify unissued classified shares, classify unissued unclassified shares, and determine the terms of shares in a class that was previously undefined in terms of preferences, rights, limitations, or other terms. However, the company’s Memorandum of Incorporation (MoI) can modify or limit these powers, potentially giving shareholders more oversight in these decisions.

In situations where shareholders seek additional control or oversight over the company’s share capital, the MoI can be drafted or amended to require shareholder approval for actions contemplated in Section 36(3).

Beneficial holders of securities

Section 56 of the Companies Act, 2008, addresses the concept of holding securities (such as shares) in a company on behalf of another person, who is the beneficial owner of those securities. While the default provision allows one person (the registered holder) to hold securities for the beneficial interest of another (the beneficial owner), a company’s Memorandum of Incorporation (MoI) can restrict or modify this arrangement. There are several situations where a company might want to include such restrictions in its MoI:

A company might restrict the practice of holding shares on behalf of others to ensure transparency in ownership. This can be particularly important for companies in industries that are heavily regulated or prone to scrutiny, where knowing the actual owners of significant shareholdings is crucial for compliance and governance.

 In companies where shareholder simplicity is a priority, restricting the ability to hold shares on behalf of others can prevent the creation of complex and opaque shareholder structures. This can simplify governance and make it easier to manage shareholder relations and communications.

A company might want to ensure that voting rights are exercised directly by those with an economic interest in the company. Restricting shares held on behalf of others can align voting power more closely with economic stakes in the company.

Companies may also restrict this practice as a measure against potential financial crimes. By ensuring shares are registered in the name of the actual owners, companies can reduce the risk of being implicated in money laundering or fraudulent activities.



Single shareholders and companies where the directors and shareholders are the same

Sections 57(2) and 57(4) of the Companies Act, 2008, provides that where there is only a single shareholder or where the directors and the shareholders are the same, certain formalities relating to decision making does not have to be adhered to. These provisions offer flexibility in corporate governance but can be tailored through the company’s Memorandum of Incorporation (MoI) to suit specific company needs, for example –

  • In a company with only one shareholder, the MoI might still determine that all decisions be well-documented.
  • In companies where all shareholders are also directors, the MoI might set rules to maintain a clear distinction between their roles and responsibilities, ensuring that decisions are made with appropriate deliberation and oversight.


Calling shareholder meetings

Section 61(3) of the Companies Act, 2008, stipulates that the board of a company, or another designated person in the MoI or company rules, must call a shareholders’ meeting if the following conditions are met:

  • There must be one or more written and signed demands for the meeting delivered to the company, and each demand must describe the same purpose for which the meeting is proposed; and

  • The demands must represent, in aggregate, at least 10% of the voting rights entitled to be exercised regarding the matter to be considered at the meeting.

Section 61(4) of the Companies Act, 2008, allows a company’s MoI to specify a lower percentage than the 10% threshold for demanding a shareholders’ meeting.

In companies where there is a desire to promote greater shareholder engagement and involvement in company affairs, you may consider lowering the threshold to make it easier for minority shareholders to call meetings. This can be particularly relevant in companies with a large number of shareholders where accumulating 10% of the voting rights might be challenging.


Location of shareholder meetings

Section 61(9) of the Companies Act, 2008, addresses the location of shareholders’ meetings for a company. This provision grants the board of a company significant flexibility in determining where to hold these meetings, including the option to have them outside the Republic of South Africa. However, the company’s Memorandum of Incorporation (MoI) can alter this default provision.

Generally, if most shareholders are based in South Africa, you may consider providing in the MoI that meetings should be held within the country to ensure that shareholders can easily attend. This is particularly relevant for companies with a large base of shareholders who may not have the means or ability to travel internationally.

For a company with significant operations or a large shareholder base outside South Africa, you may want to consider providing in the MoI that meetings will be held in locations where the company has substantial business interests, facilitating easier participation for international shareholders.


Notice of meetings

Section 62 (1) of the Companies Act, 2008, sets out the requirements for the minimum notice periods that a company must adhere to when calling a shareholders meeting. The Company’s MoI can, however, change this notice period.

 If a company has a large, diverse shareholder base, possibly including international shareholders, you may consider extending the notice period in the MoI to allow shareholders more time to arrange their participation.

Conversely, in fast-paced industries or in situations where quick decision-making is crucial (like in a crisis), you may consider reducing the notice period to ensure agility and timely responses to emerging challenges or opportunities.


Record date

Section 59(3) of the Companies Act, 2008, deals with the “record date” for company actions, particularly in the context of shareholder rights and participation. The record date is crucial as it determines which shareholders are entitled to notice of a meeting, to vote, and to participate during the meeting.

If the board does not specifically determine a record date for a shareholders’ meeting, the default record date becomes the latest date by which the company is required to give shareholders notice of that meeting. This ensures that the list of shareholders entitled to receive notice of the meeting is up-to-date as of a specific date.

For companies with a complex or rapidly changing shareholder base, you may consider providing a different mechanism for determining a record date.  This may be advantageous to ensure clarity and fairness in determining who is entitled to vote, receive dividends, or participate.



Section 64 of the Companies Act, 2008, sets out the requirements for a quorum at shareholder meetings and provides for various scenarios related to the commencement, adjournment, and continuation of these meetings. The Memorandum of Incorporation (MoI) of a company can modify several aspects of these requirements to better suit the company’s specific needs and circumstances. Here’s a breakdown of the key aspects that the MoI can change regarding quorum at shareholder meetings:


  • Initial quorum requirement: A meeting cannot begin unless persons present can exercise at least 25% of all voting rights entitled to be exercised on at least one matter to be decided at the meeting.

  • Quorum for each matter: Each matter cannot be considered unless persons present can exercise at least 25% of all voting rights entitled to be exercised on that matter.

  • Minimum shareholder requirement: Regardless of the percentage of voting rights, at least three shareholders must be present if the company has more than two shareholders.

  • Quorum maintenance: Once a quorum has been established, the meeting can continue as long as at least one shareholder with voting rights is present.

  • Adjournments: The meeting can be adjourned if the quorum is not met, and specific timelines are set for postponed or adjourned meetings.


Aspects the MoI Can Change

  1. Percentage for quorum: The MoI can specify a lower or higher percentage than the default 25% for the initial quorum and for considering each matter. This can be useful in companies where a 25% threshold is too high (or too low) to be practical due to the size or distribution of the shareholder base.

  2. Timeline adjustments for adjournments: The MoI can provide for different time periods than the default one hour for waiting for a quorum and one week for adjourned or postponed meetings. This flexibility can be important for companies that require more (or less) flexibility in scheduling and rescheduling meetings.

  3. Extended periods for adjournment: The MoI can set different or unlimited maximum periods for adjournment beyond the default 120 business days after the record date or 60 business days after the adjournment occurred. This could be relevant for companies that operate in industries with long project cycles or where decision-making requires extensive consultation.

  4. Further notice requirements: The MoI can stipulate different requirements for giving notice of adjourned or postponed meetings, which can be tailored to the company’s communication policies or shareholder needs.



Section 65 of the Companies Act, 2008, sets out the framework for how resolutions are passed by shareholders, distinguishing between ordinary and special resolutions. It also provides for the flexibility to tailor these voting requirements through the company’s Memorandum of Incorporation (MoI). The MoI can modify several aspects of the voting process to better align with the company’s specific needs and governance structure.

  1. Threshold for passing ordinary resolutions:

    • Companies Act – More than 50% of the voting rights exercised on the resolution.
    • MoI Modification: The MoI can specify a higher percentage of voting rights needed to pass an ordinary resolution. This could be relevant in companies where a greater consensus is desired for certain decisions.
  2. Threshold for passing special resolutions:

    • Companies Act – At least 75% of the voting rights exercised on the resolution.
    • MoI Modification: The MoI can set a different percentage (higher or lower) for the approval of special resolutions. This flexibility can be important for critical decisions that may have a significant impact on the company.
  3. Varying percentages for different matters:

    • The MoI can specify different percentages of voting rights for the approval of ordinary or special resolutions concerning particular matters. This allows the company to require higher or lower levels of consensus for specific types of decisions.
  4. Margin between ordinary and special resolutions:

    • The MoI must maintain a margin of at least 10 percentage points between the highest requirement for an ordinary resolution and the lowest for a special resolution. This ensures a clear distinction in the level of consensus required for different types of decisions.



Section 58(3) of the Companies Act, 2008, pertains to the appointment and roles of proxies by shareholders for attending and voting at shareholders’ meetings. The Memorandum of Incorporation (MoI) of a company has the power to modify these default proxy arrangements. The default position under the Companies Act, 2008, provides:

  • A shareholder may appoint two or more proxies concurrently, allowing different proxies to represent the shareholder for different securities they hold.
  • A proxy can delegate their authority to another person, subject to any restrictions in the proxy appointment.
  • The instrument appointing a proxy must be delivered to the company or a designated person before the proxy exercises the shareholder’s rights at a meeting.

The MoI can change the default postion under the Companies Act, 2008, as follow:

  •  The MoI can restrict shareholders to appointing only one proxy, instead of multiple proxies, to simplify the voting process and reduce the potential complexity at shareholders’ meetings.

  • The MoI can impose restrictions or completely prohibit the delegation of a proxy’s authority to another person. This can be done to ensure that the proxy directly represents the shareholder’s interests.

  • The MoI can specify different requirements for the delivery of the proxy instrument, such as a different timeline or method of delivery. This can be tailored to suit the company’s administrative convenience and ensure efficient processing of proxy appointments.

  • The MoI could set specific conditions or timeframes for the validity of proxy appointments, providing more control over the proxy process and ensuring that appointments are current and relevant to the specific meeting.



Composition of the board

Section 66 of the Companies Act, 2008, outlines the governance structure regarding the management and administration of companies in South Africa, specifying the role and composition of the board of directors. This section establishes the foundation for how companies are directed and controlled, giving the board broad authority while allowing for specific modifications through the company’s Memorandum of Incorporation (MoI). Here’s a breakdown of the key provisions and how the MoI can amend these aspects:

  • Board authority and management:

    • The board has the authority to manage the company’s business and affairs, exercising all powers and performing functions of the company, except as limited by the Act or the MoI.
  • Minimum number of directors:

    • Private or personal liability companies must have at least one director.
    • Public or non-profit companies must have at least three directors.
  • MoI specification of director numbers:

    • The MoI may specify a higher number of directors than the minimums outlined above.
  • Director appointment and removal:

    • The MoI can allow for the direct appointment and removal of directors by named persons or criteria specified within the MoI.
    • It can designate a person as an ex officio director based on holding another position (for example, the CEO of the Company can be regarded as an ex officio director).
    • It may provide for the appointment of alternate directors.
  • Remuneration:
    • Allows the company to pay remuneration to its directors for their service, unless the MoI provides otherwise.
  • Committees:

    • Directors can be appointed to more than one committee, and when calculating the minimum number of directors, a director appointed to multiple committees is counted only once.


Changing the default position in the MoI

  • Increasing the Minimum Number of Directors:

    • The MoI can require more directors than the statutory minimum, which might be beneficial for larger companies or those seeking a broader range of expertise on their board.
  • Direct appointment and removal of directors:

    • The MoI can set out specific provisions for the appointment and removal of directors by certain stakeholders or under certain conditions, offering more control to specific shareholders or groups (It should, however, be noted that for-profit companies, the MoI must ensure that at least 50% of the directors and alternate directors are elected by shareholders).
  • Ex officio directors:

    • The MoI can designate individuals who automatically become directors by virtue of their position, ensuring that certain key positions or expertise are always represented on the board.
  • Alternate directors:

    • The MoI can make provisions for alternate directors, ensuring continuity and representation when primary directors are unavailable.
  • Election process:

    • While it must provide for the election of at least 50% of directors by shareholders, the MoI can detail the process, criteria, and conditions for these elections, potentially setting a higher threshold for shareholder-elected directors.
  • Remuneration:
    • A company might amend its MoI to provide that directors will not be paid remuneration or require more detailed disclosure or shareholder approval processes for director remuneration to enhance transparency and shareholder oversight.
  • Committees:

    • The MoI can set specific rules about committee appointments, such as limiting the number of committees a director can serve on or requiring a certain composition for committees. However, it must comply with the Act’s provision that a director counts only once for the purpose of calculating the minimum number of directors.


Section 73 of the Companies Act, 2008, outlines various provisions related to the conduct of board meetings. The Memorandum of Incorporation (MoI) of a company plays a significant role in allowing customization of these default provisions to better suit the specific governance practices and needs of the company. Here’s where the MoI can change the default position relating to director meetings:


Calling of board meetings

  • Default Position: A meeting must be called if at least 25% of the directors (in the case of a board with at least 12 members) or at least two directors (in any other case) demand it.
  • MoI Modifications: The MoI can specify a higher or lower percentage or number of directors required to call a meeting, providing flexibility in how board initiatives can be prompted.


Electronic participation in board meetings

  • Default Position: Board meetings can be conducted entirely via electronic communication, or directors can participate in a meeting electronically, provided the technology allows for effective, concurrent communication.
  • MoI Modifications: While the Act allows for electronic meetings, the MoI could impose specific conditions under which electronic participation is allowed, or potentially restrict it for certain types of meetings, ensuring that the technology used meets certain standards or that electronic participation is used in specific circumstances.


Notice of board meetings

  • Default Position: The board determines the form and timing of meeting notices, with all directors needing to be notified, subject to the ability to waive notice requirements under certain conditions.
  • MoI Modifications: The MoI can set out more stringent requirements for meeting notices, such as longer notice periods, specific methods of delivery, or conditions under which notice can be waived, to ensure all directors have adequate time to prepare for meetings.


Quorum, voting, and decisions

  • Default Position: A majority of directors must be present for a quorum; each director has one vote, with a majority of votes needed to pass a resolution; and provisions for tied votes.
  • MoI Modifications: The MoI can alter these aspects by setting a different threshold for a quorum, changing the weight of individual directors’ votes, adjusting the majority needed for different types of decisions, or specifying different procedures for handling tied votes. For example, it could require a larger majority for certain critical decisions or provide specific directors with veto power under certain conditions.


By modifying these default provisions, a company can tailor its governance practices to align with its operational needs, shareholder expectations, and strategic goals. For instance, a company with a small board might lower the threshold for calling meetings to ensure agility in decision-making, while a company with a diverse or international board might implement stricter notice and participation requirements to accommodate the logistical challenges of assembling directors.


Section 72 of the Companies Act, 2008, provides for the establishment of committees by the board of a company, delegation of board authority to these committees, and the composition and powers of such committees. The Memorandum of Incorporation (MoI) of a company has the flexibility to modify these default provisions to better align with the company’s specific governance framework and operational needs. Here’s how the MoI can change the default positions:


Appointment and Authority of Committees

  • Default Position: The board can appoint any number of director committees and delegate any of its authority to them.
  • MoI Modifications: The MoI can specify limitations or conditions on the board’s ability to appoint committees or delegate authority. For example, it might require shareholder approval for the establishment of certain committees or limit the types of authority that can be delegated.


Committee Composition

  • Default Position: Committees may include non-directors, provided these individuals are not disqualified from being directors, but such non-director members cannot vote on committee decisions.
  • MoI Modifications: The MoI can further restrict or broaden the eligibility for committee membership, potentially excluding non-directors entirely or specifying particular qualifications or expertise required for committee members. It can also outline specific roles for non-director members within these committees.


Consultation and Advice

  • Default Position: Committees may consult with or receive advice from any person.
  • MoI Modifications: While the Act allows for broad consultation, the MoI could set guidelines or limitations regarding who committees can consult, ensuring that consultations align with the company’s ethical guidelines or strategic objectives.


Committee Authority

  • Default Position: Committees have the full authority of the board concerning matters referred to them, except as limited by the Act, the MoI, or a board resolution.
  • MoI Modifications: The MoI can specify certain decisions or actions that cannot be delegated to a committee, ensuring that critical matters remain under the direct control of the full board. It might also require that certain committee decisions receive final approval from the full board.


By tailoring these aspects of committee governance, a company can ensure that its committees are structured and operate in a manner that supports effective decision-making, risk management, and strategic oversight. For instance, a company operating in a highly regulated industry might restrict committee membership to individuals with specific regulatory expertise or require that all committee actions related to compliance receive final board approval.

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